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Ambiguity: The Hidden Hearsay
Danger Almost Nobody Talks About*
By PAUL BERGMAN**
INTRODUCTION
This essay is about ambiguous hearsay statements. In all of
the vast hearsay literature, this topic has been given scant atten-
tion by both courts and commentators; yet, the topic is impor-
tant for a number of reasons. First, the scholarly attention that
it has received reveals an interesting divergence of views. Second,
the results of work done by linguistics researchers are now
available to inform legal thinkers about ambiguity. Finally, the
enactment of the "catch-all" hearsay exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence means that ambiguity itself may render a
proffered piece of hearsay inadmissible.' At the least, ambiguity
may allow one to argue to the trier of fact that admitted hearsay
lacks probative value. These factors combine to recommend a
new look at this largely neglected topic.
To set the scene for the discussion, recall that the hearsay
rule exists primarily to protect a party's right to cross-examine
adverse testimony. 2 That is, when a witness testifies in court,
opposing counsel has the right to cross-examine the witness in
an effort to detract from the probative worth of the testimony.
The issues that cross-examiners, typically probe when they seek
to undercut adverse testimony may be grouped into categories
* Copyright © 1987 by Paul Bergman.
** Professor of Law, U.C.L.A. B.A. 1965, U.C.L.A.; J.D. 1968, Cal. Berkeley.
My colleagues Al Moore, Leon Letwin and Norm Abrams graciously read the manuscript
and offered valuable comments; I hope the final draft does them justice. I also thank
the various supermarket tabloids for suggesting the form of the title.
I FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (hearsay with "equivalent circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness" to specified exceptions admissible when other factors met).
2 See C. MCCORMCK, McCORMUCK ON EVmENCE § 245 (3d ed. 1984); 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1362 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
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reminiscent of the Four Horsepeople of the Apocalypse: Mem-
ory, Sincerity, Perception and Ambiguity. Because one usually
cannot inquire into these matters when faced with hearsay evi-
dence, these four factors are regarded as the "dangers" against
which the hearsay rule protects. 3 In turn, hearsay rule exceptions
have been carved out in situations where at least some of the
dangers are obviated.
4
Courts, however, typically do not examine the admissibility
of proffered items of hearsay in terms of individual dangers.
The present rule holding hearsay inadmissible' dates back three
centuries; 6 many of the present exceptions to the rule7 date back
to the early 1700's.8 As a result, the rule and its exceptions have
crystallized into relatively fixed foundational requirements, with
attorneys and judges usually focusing their attention on specific
foundational elements rather than on the underlying dangers.
For example, one who claims that a hearsay assertion should be
admitted as an "excited utterance" may argue that the assertion
was made close in time to an event, but usually will not discuss
the relationship between the closeness in time and such "dan-
gers" as memory and sincerity.
The enactment of the "catch-all" exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence has caused a portion of the crystallized hear-
say world to remain molten and malleable. The "catch-alls"
permit the admission of hearsay, even if no statutory exception
applies, if the hearsay has "circumstantial guarantees of trus-
tworthiness" which are equivalent to the statutory exceptions.9
When a hearsay statement, not satisfying a statutory exception,
is offered into evidence, the search for equivalency may take at
least two forms. One form is to match foundational elements
I The term "dangers" was first used in Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Rule, 62 HAgv. L. REv. 177, 185 (1948). Of course, in many
instances opposing counsel in fact will be able to cross-examine a witness whose hearsay
statement has been admitted. In the archetypal hearsay situation, however, the hearsay
declarant is not in court.
4 See WiMoRE, supra note 2, at § 1420.
1 See FED. R. Evm. 801.
6 WXoMoRE, supra note 2, at § 1364 (history of hearsay rule begins in 1500's).
7 See FED. R. Evin. 803, 804.
1 See WOMORE, supra note 2, at § 1430 (dying declarations); § 1455 (declarations
against interest).
9 FED. R. EviD. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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against those already crystallized in existing exceptions. The
other is to analyze admissibility in terms of the dangers for
which the hearsay rule was created.
When faced with hearsay offered under the "catch-all" ex-
ceptions, courts currently tend to follow the latter approach. At
least at the appellate level, courts typically analyze trustworthi-
ness factors surrounding the making of statements rather than
rely on established foundational categories.10 Many opinions have
discussed the admissibility of hearsay under the "catch-all" ex-
ceptions. The expectation that each of the hearsay dangers would
have received about equal appellate attention has not been re-
alized, at least where ambiguity is concerned. A computer search
of appellate cases decided since the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence turned up no cases citing the ambiguity of an
assertion as a reason for its exclusion.'
Whether this finding is surprising may turn on one's inter-
pretation of the term "ambiguity." As shown in Section I,
evidence scholars have used the term in quite different ways. I
use it in the oft-understood sense of describing a statement whose
meaning is doubtful or uncertain. 2 Using this definition, if a
hearsay assertion from a non-testifying witness is ambiguous, its
admission exposes opposing counsel to a danger that cross-
examination cannot readily overcome. A court, faced with an
ambiguous utterance offered under the "catch-all" exceptions,13
might rule either that the ambiguity renders the assertion un-
trustworthy and therefore inadmissible, or that the ambiguity so
affects the assertion's probative value that the assertion's value
" See McCoRMICK, supra note 2, at § 324.1. See also infra notes 85-100 and
accompanying text.
" This search was conducted personally by the author, a true neophyte of the
computer age. Clearly, though, few such cases exist.
'2 See WEBSTFR'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 35 (1980).
- Although this Article is limited to situations arising under the hearsay "catch-
all" exceptions, it would be appropriate to use its analysis in situations arising under
the specific statutory exceptions as well. In the latter instance, both the courts and the
parties typically focus on whether specific foundational requirements have been met,
tending to obscure the argument that an assertion is ambiguous. Note, however, at least
with some of the specific statutory exceptions, that an assertion whose meaning is
ambiguous may not qualify for admission because the ambiguity prevents the assertion
from meeting a foundational requirement. See Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 957, 964-65 (1974).
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is outweighed by its prejudicial impact. 14 When an ambiguous
statement is nonetheless admitted, the ambiguity provides the
opposing counsel with a way of attacking the credibility of the
assertion.
This essay offers an interpretation of the danger of ambiguity
that differs in some respects from that traditionally offered. It
relies on literature developed by linguists and others to aid in
recognition of ambiguous statements. Most of us are familiar
with the catch phrase, "What we have here is a failure to
communicate." We typically understand it to refer to the com-
plete absence of communication, or to communication blocked
by non-rational, emotional responses. We do not see ourselves
readily as producers or victims of a failure to communicate in
either instance. This essay attempts to demonstrate that certain
features of our English language are prone to create ambiguity,
that all of us are prospective producers and victims, and that
when a victim cannot cross-examine the maker of an ambiguous
hearsay assertion, a court may appropriately exclude that asser-
tion.
Section I sets out the four hearsay dangers in more detail,
focusing on the subtly different interpretations that ambiguity
has received from scholars. I conclude that ambiguity is not
produced only by the failings of those unfamiliar with the Eng-
lish language, as some have said, but rather by certain charac-
teristics of our language. Section II explores features of our
language which are especially likely to produce ambiguity. Sec-
tion III reviews the way in which the federal appellate courts
have analyzed hearsay assertions offered under the "catch-all"
exceptions, and concludes that ambiguity is almost totally ignored
as a basis for excluding hearsay. Finally, Section IV sets forth
and discusses a number of cases in which ambiguity might have
figured into the decision, but did not. I do not argue that these
cases were decided incorrectly and have not selected them be-
cause they happen to corroborate the points raised in the essay.
Instead, cases have been selected because they are "leading"
14 See FED. R. Evm. 403 (permits exclusion of relevant evidence if probative value
substantially outweighed by danger of unfair predjudice, confusion, or waste of time).
These rulings should be substantially equivalent.
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cases, and I offer the discussion to illustrate the types of analyses
I hope courts will undertake in the future.
I. TuiE AMiBI=TY OF AMBIGUITY
Imagine that a clerk in a small convenience market has been
robbed during the early morning hours. Witness A enters the
market shortly after the robbery and is told by Declarant, "The
robber was tall." The defendant, who is about 6 feet tall, is
now on trial for the robbery. The whereabouts of Declarant are
unknown and Witness A is called by the prosecutor to testify to
what Declarant said. The purpose of the testimony, according
to the prosecutor, is to link the defendant to the robbery. A's
testimony is clearly hearsay, and the risks of Declarant's faulty
memory, sincerity and perception are apparent.15 But how would
we describe the risk of ambiguity or faulty narration?
We begin by considering the views of Professor Edmund
Morgan, who, in a 1948 law review article, was the first to
describe the testimonial dangers protected against by the hearsay
rule.' 6 Unfortunately, Morgan, who referred to this danger as
both "use of language" and "narration," was ambiguous about
the nature of the danger. Morgan may be understood as asso-
ciating the danger with unknown personal idiosyncracies in a
speaker's use of words. Referring to this danger he stated, "[I]n
deciding what idea Witness intended to convey, Trier has to rely
upon assumptions as to the use of language by Witness and
upon his own power of translating language into ideas."' 7 For
instance, in the hypothetical robbery case, there is a risk that
Declarant used the term "tall" for a physical characteristic most
11 The risk of faulty memory entails such issues as the length of time that intervened
between the observation and the assertion, and what other events occurred during that
time period. In the realm of perception, we want to know how well Declarant was able
to see the robber, what the lighting was like, and any personal matters (such as fears
for Declarant's own safety) that might have affected Declarant's ability to observe
accurately. As to sincerity, we are interested primarily in Declarant's frame of mind-
was he speaking honestly, or did he have a vendetta against tall people? Did Declarant
have a vendetta against the defendant and, knowing that the defendant was tall, made
the assertion to implicate him in the robbery? In Declarant's absence, the cross-examiner
cannot raise such issues.




other people would refer to as "stocky." Declarant was not
intending to mislead anyone, but was using language in a dif-
ferent way than most people. Therefore, in the absence of cross-
examination, the trier of fact cannot be sure that the reality it
associates with the term "tall" matches Declarant's reality.
Elsewhere in the essay, however, Morgan seemed to regard
the narrative risk more as an adjunct to the risk of insincerity.
He coupled the terms "sincerity" and "misuse of language,"
and gave examples in which, by careful wording, a witness could
tell a half-truth and thereby convey a purposefully false impres-
sion. 18 In the same vein, he mentioned the case of a prosecution
for bookmaking, in which part of the evidence was that a
telephone caller gave his initials, asked for "Russ," and placed
a bet. Referring to the risk of misinterpretation of the caller's
words, Morgan stated: "It is quite possible, though perhaps
highly improbable, that the speaker was using a code in some
secret transaction other than gambling on the races ... the
language may have been used for the express purpose of con-
veying a totally wrong impression to all interceptors.' 9 These
passages and examples suggest that, in Morgan's view, the risks
of insincerity and unusual use of language were closely aligned.
In fact, that view has been echoed in the latest edition of the
McCormick evidence treatise, which states that "[s]ome writers
subdivide inaccuracy of narration into ambiguity and insincerity,
resulting in four rather than three factors. However, it seems
apparent that ambiguity and insincerity, as well as honest mis-
take, all manifest themselves as inaccuracy of narration.
'20
In any event, having in mind that the hearsay rule primarily
protects the right to cross-examine adverse testimony, Morgan
was not impressed with the danger of misuse of language as an
explanation for the rule. He stated:
[I]n any case cross-examination may expose defects in sincerity,
use of language, memory or perception, but in the vast ma-
ll Id. at 185-88.
19 Id. at 198.
0 McComiuicK, supra note 2, § 245, at 726. The McCormick treatise's treatment
of the risk of insincerity, however, has not been a model of consistency. The Second
Edition included insincerity only as an aspect of the 3 other infirmities, a grouping that
one commentator has termed "inexplicable." Tribe, supra note 13, at 958 n.8.
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jority of lawsuits its principal utility will be in limiting or
eliminating the danger of deception through faults in memory
and perception.. .The truth is that the danger that Trier may
be led astray by the peculiar use of language upon which he
must rely in making a finding is not a unique characteristic of
hearsay. In the judicial consideration of hearsay, it is generally
overlooked, and it may be cogently urged that to make the
presence of this danger in itself a decisive factor would be to
make the definition of hearsay uselessly broad.21
In an article written thirteen years after Morgan's, Professor
John Maguire perceived the risks of inexact narration and of
insincerity as fundamentally different.22 Insincerity, Maguire be-
lieved, is an express deviation from actual belief, but a "purely
verbalistic shortcoming... has no moral content;" 23 it is simply
the risk that a declarant, although striving to convey as correct
an account as possible, is incapable of doing S0.24 Having shorn
the risk of ambiguity (which he termed inexact verbalization)
from intentional misstatement, Maguire, like Morgan before
him, viewed this risk as a rather trivial danger. Maguire wrote:
"Aside from the young child with a limited and unanchored
vocabulary, or the foreigner deficient in the common local tongue
yet attempting to use it when testifying, the risk of inexact
verbalization is not commonly very threatening. ' 25 Maguire's
characterization of the narration danger has become widespread.
For instance, in a leading evidence textbook, authors Lempert
and Saltzburg give this example of ambiguity: "If the jurors
discover that W has only recently learned to speak English and
that she has frequently confused red with yellow, they will be
wary of giving too much weight to her testimony.
' 26
Divorcing the risks of ambiguity and insincerity may be
analytically correct, but doing so only seems to heighten the
2' Morgan, supra note 3, at 188, 199.
12 Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L.




' R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 351 (2d ed.
1982). See also 4 J. WEnsTErN's EVIDENCE 800(01), at 800-9-1 (1979): "He may be
... incapable of translating his memory into language that will have the same meaning
for his listeners." Id.
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former's insignificance. Everyday experience teaches that persons
often choose their words intentionally to convey something other
than what they really mean. But the risk that many persons are
not capable of expressing themselves adequately appears much
lower. If forced to defend the hearsay rule only on the ground
that it protected against this risk, few would leap at the oppor-
tunity. Given the small dimensions of the box into which the
danger of ambiguity has been placed, one commentator not
surprisingly concluded, "Well-known writers on trial technique
•.. seldom even consider the narration problem...." 27
Another thirteen years having passed, Professor Laurence
Tribe came forward with an article concerned, at least in part,
with the danger of ambiguity.n Tribe adhered to Maguire's
distinction between insincerity and faulty (but innocent) niscom-
munication, but Tribe (using the term "ambiguity") noted a
broader spectrum of innocent miscommunication than Maguire.
For Maguire, faulty narration was produced by an inability to
communicate clearly. Tribe, on the other hand, seemed to rec-
ognize that, regardless of the communicative ability of a speaker,
what the speaker says still may be ambiguous. Although Tribe
did not explicitly distinguish his formulation from Maguire's,
when discussing ambiguity Tribe used illustrations which have
nothing to do with inability to communicate. For example, Tribe
pointed out that ambiguity is not a danger when a hearsay
statement is admitted under the hearsay exception for declara-
tions against interest, because a statement cannot be admitted
under this rationale unless it is sufficiently unambiguous to be
found against the declarant's interest. 29 Similarly, Tribe noted
that treatises and statements of medical history to physicians
likewise may be ambiguous.A0 In none of these situations would
we think generally that ambiguity might arise because a declarant
lacked the ability to communicate.
Tribe's article suggests, then, that ambiguity is a feature of
assertions themselves, not simply of the limited language ability
1 Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. Rnv. 682, 690 (1962).
2, Tribe, supra note 13, at 957.
29 Id. at 964-65.
" Id. at 966.
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of certain speakers. The act of reducing actual events and objects
to verbal form may produce ambiguity. Although the shift from
Maguire's conception of inexact verbalization to Tribe's notion
of ambiguity seems small, we might expect that Tribe's broader
conception would lead him to see ambiguity as a more serious
risk than did Maguire. Maguire, recall, viewed the risk of inexact
verbalization as generally unthreatening. Tribe, however, em-
phasized the need for cross-examination to expose potential am-
biguity:
It may be, for example, that the differential treatment [of
different hearsay exceptions] corresponds to a judicial assump-
tion that cross-examination is a more vital and effective tool
in exposing weaknesses of perception and memory than in
exposing ambiguity and insincerity ... Yet this seems inher-
ently implausible ... The role of cross-examination with re-
spect to ambiguity is particularly important."
Thirteen years having passed since Tribe's article, this essay
seeks to amplify and to give additional content to Tribe's broader
formulation of the danger of ambiguity. 32 If ambiguity is con-
sidered a feature of statements rather than speakers, it poses a
legitimate hearsay danger. People who are undoubtedly sincere
and fully conversant in language arts may make assertions that,
in the light of events, are ambiguous. Moreover, ambiguity is a
unique hearsay danger. The dangers of sincerity, memory, and
perception all involve issues that are external to whatever a
hearsay declarant says. For example, return to the earlier hearsay
assertion: "The robber was tall." The time lag between the event
and the statement (memory), the physical condition and location
of the declarant (perception), and the possible bias of the speaker
(sincerity) each can be assessed for trustworthiness by a court
without paying attention to the precise words uttered by the
declarant. As matters external to the statement, they typically
are assessed without examination of the statement itself. If two
weeks have elapsed between the time of the robbery and the
11 Id. at 967-68, 969 n.42.
12 The 13 year gaps are a curious anomaly that does suggest a historical imperative
that this essay be published in 1987. I in no way suggest, however, that the essay deserves
to be as influential as those by Morgan, Maguire and Tribe.
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declarant's statement, or if the declarant habitually wears a T-
shirt sporting the slogan, "Tall people are geeks," then we know
that memory and sincerity are dangers without analyzing the
speaker's words. On the other hand, an ambiguity determination
compels us to examine precisely what a declarant said.
Even if we agree that ambiguity is analytically separate from
its companion dangers, this brief review of its scholarly treat-
ment may indicate why ambiguity has received such sparse at-
tention from appellate courts. To the extent that ambiguity is
linked with sincerity, courts, making a trustworthiness evaluation
under the "catch-all" exceptions, are more likely to focus on
the latter than on the former. Sincerity-motivation-is a part
of the external world quite familiar to judges and attorneys, and
a declarant's relationship, if any, to parties in a case provides
insight into possible motivations. 33 To the extent that ambiguity
is a product of speakers with limited language ability, it is simply
not a factor that can be expected to arise with any frequency.
What of the third possibility, only hinted at by Morgan, that
any assertion can be ambiguous because we cannot be sure that
a declarant attaches the same meaning to a word as ordinary
people, especially ordinary people sitting as triers of fact? This
observation is of course correct; unless we can question someone,
we can never be certain that a speaker does not, for example,
belong to a cultural group whose term for what most of us call
"spaghetti" is "revolver." But the observation proves too much,
and it too has the effect of consigning ambiguity to the hearsay
scrapheap. Every word is ambiguous, having no inherent mean-
ing except that which individuals or groups assign to it.34 Only
when two people agree on a word's meaning does the word have
any communicative value. Moreover, the more precisely we need
to know what a word means (often in lawsuits), the more likely
divergence exists between the meaning a speaker intends and the
meaning a listener gives to an assertion. The meaning given to
words is highly dependent on individual experiences, and because
no two individuals have shared the same experiences, each is
11 Motivation is a recurring factor employed when courts make a trustworthiness
determination. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 324.2, at 909. See also infra text
accompanying note 93.
14 Those who expect a bit of "jabberwocky" here are to suffer disappointment.
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likely to interpret an assertion differently.35 For example, to
return to the hypothetical robbery, the declarant's sense of what
constitutes a "tall" person is likely to be somewhat at variance
with a listener's sense. The United States Supreme Court has
stated this principle rather poetically: "A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and
may vary greatly in color and content according to the circum-
stances and the time in which it is used.
' 36
If the inherent ambiguity of symbolic language were recog-
nized as a primary hearsay danger, it would with one stroke
wipe out the admissibility of all hearsay unless the declarant was
present in court to explain the meaning she intended by her
words. That, to use Morgan's words, "would be to make the
definition of hearsay uselessly broad. ' 37 Our rules of evidence
are nothing if not a pragmatic compromise between our need
for an adequate amount of information to resolve disputes and
our desire to insist that the information have an indicia of
trustworthiness. That is, for decisions to be consistent enough
with reality to encourage persons to leave their disputes to the
legal system, the rules of evidence must be sufficiently lax to
permit parties to offer enough evidence to allow an image of
reality to emerge. At the same time, the rules somehow must
constrain evidence lest verdicts be based on rumor, innuendo,
and prejudice. Unless we can be confident that an assertion is
ambiguous, the pragmatic approach of the rules of evidence
points to the admissibility of hearsay if the only reason for its
exclusion is the possibility of ambiguity inherent in all spoken
language. If anything, "liberalization [of the rule against hear-
say] will probably continue as a general rule to dominate the
course of development. ' 3
The inherent ambiguity of language has not, and un-
doubtedly will not, serve as a basis for excluding hearsay evi-
dence. It may, however, incline one toward the view that
ambiguous statements carry the badge of their own weakness,
and therefore little risk exists that a trier of fact will overvalue
" See, e.g., MmRs, THE DYN. mcs OF HrmAA ComMUmcATIoN 103-07 (1976).
" Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
-7 Morgan, supra note 3, at 199.
" McCoptaicK, supra note 2, at § 327.
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an ambiguous assertion. In Tribe's words: "Unlike the other
infirmities, the ambiguity of a hearsay act or utterance is usually
apparent on its face and can easily be evaluated by the trier."
' 39
For example, assume that all agree the assertion "The robber
was tall" is somewhat ambiguous, because the declarant and the
trier may have different personal experiences concerning the
height at which people are considered tall. The argument then
goes that the trier can be trusted to recognize the ambiguity and
evaluate the evidence accordingly.
Thus, an argument that ambiguity deserves a rightful place
among the four hearsay dangers faces something of a dilemma.
On the one hand, because even the simplest assertion (e.g., "The
light was red") is potentially ambiguous, we cannot premise an
exclusionary rule of evidence on such an all-encompassing factor.
On the other hand, perhaps an exclusionary rule is not necessary,
because we can trust the trier of fact to recognize ambiguity and
factor it into the evaluative process. If ambiguity is a genuine
rather than hypothetical hearsay danger, certain factors must
exist giving particular statements a greater potential for ambi-
guity-factors that are likely to go unnoticed by a trier of fact.
Work by linguistics researchers indicates that such factors are
indeed present in our language. These factors provide the subject
of Section II.
II. LANGUAGE FEATURES LIKELY TO PRODUCE AMBIGUITY
Until this point the danger of ambiguity has resembled the
standard bad dreams of childhood-when you open your eyes
and look around, it seems to vanish. Yet the frequent failure of
people to communicate effectively, whether in social or profes-
sional relationships, suggests that factors of which we are little
aware may block understanding. Communication issues have
been studied largely in recent years, and some of the findings
are relevant to concerns about the admissibility of ambiguous
hearsay. Before turning to those findings, I want to eliminate
from consideration certain connotations of ambiguity that do
not in fact bear on our concerns.
11 Tribe, supra note 13, at 969 n.42.
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We may begin by eliminating from consideration two famil-
iar instances in which ambiguity is present on the face of an
assertion. "Lexical" ambiguity may arise when a word has mul-
tiple meanings. 4° For example, the statement, "I am going to
the bank," may signify an imminent robbery, an afternoon of
trout fishing, or perhaps a deft billiards shot. In a legal context
this type of ambiguity creates little more than a theoretical
danger, because the surrounding circumstances typically will pro-
vide ample evidence of a declarant's probable meaning. More-
over, the possible ambiguity likely will be apparent on the face
of the assertion and will be evaluated accordingly.
The second type of ambiguity, "structural" or "syntactic"
ambiguity, results from careless construction of a sentence. For
example, the sentence, "College demands change," is structur-
ally ambiguous. Both "demands" and "change" might be taken
as either a verb or a noun. The ambiguity disappears when
proper structural signals are included in the sentence. "College
demands will change," is no longer structurally ambiguous.
41
Although most hearsay declarants lack the erudition of Professor
Henry Higgins, 42 this form of ambiguity too is of little concern.
In a setting in which an assertion is typically part of a series of
events, those events almost certainly will provide meaning to a
structurally ambiguous sentence. And again, the potential am-
biguous meaning will in all likelihood be apparent to a trier of
fact.
In each of these instances, ambiguity which can trouble a
linguist very much is of little concern to lawyers. Linguists often
restrict their analyses to the morphology of sentences. In so
doing, they intentionally foctis on sentences in isolation from
each other and are not concerned with a sentence as part of a
chain of proof. Lawyers at trial, by contrast, offer assertions
into evidence as part of larger stories, 43 with the hope that the
trier of fact will draw helpful inferences. An assertion that might
be ambiguous if used for one purpose might not be if used for
"1 Taha, Types of Syntactic Ambiguity in English, XXI/#4 IRAL 251 (Nov. 1983).
" Id.
41 G. SHw, PYGMALION 109 (1916) (Professor Higgins, a character in the play,
Pygmalion, is a professor of phonetics.).
41 See D. BINDER & P. BERGmAN, FACT INVESTIGATION 11-13 (1984).
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another. 44 The instrumental use of assertions and the surround-
ing context as a basis for inferences render these linguistic forms
of ambiguity largely irrelevant.
Because lawyers offer assertions as a basis for inferences,
however, a form of ambiguity may arise in a legal context that
does not arise when one studies only sentence structure. This
potential ambiguity grows out of the nature of circumstantial
evidence. Circumstantial evidence leads to a conclusion only by
means of an underlying premise. By choosing different premises,
one can draw opposite conclusions from the same piece of
evidence.45 For instance, return to the assertion, "the robber
was tall," and assume the declarant makes that statement on
the witness stand. The prosecution may adopt the premise, "Peo-
ple who are about six feet tall are more likely to be identified
as tall than people who are less than six feet tall," and urge
that the remark tends to link the six foot tall defendant to the
crime. The defense counsel, however, seeking to attack the wit-
ness' credibility, may adopt the premise, "People who cannot
identify someone apart from a general estimation of their height
are less observant than people who can give more exact descrip-
tions," and urge that the trier of fact should give no weight to
the identification. In the sense that circumstantial evidence can
be the subject of contradictory premises, it may be thought of
as "ambiguous." This, however, is a function of inferential
reasoning, and not a form of ambiguity that renders evidence
inadmissible. 46
With these ambiguity considerations safely off to the side,
we next consider features of our language that tend to produce
ambiguity that are not likely to be readily apparent on the face
of an assertion.
- See Tribe, supra note 13, at 966-67.
41 See BnDER & BERGiAAN, supra note 43, at 82-89.
46 Quite the contrary; as long as a relevant inference may be drawn from the
evidence, the evidence is admissible even though stronger competing inferences also
might be drawn. This is incorporated into the definition of relevance: evidence is relevant
if it has "any tendency" to make a fact more or less probable. FED. R. EvmD. 401. Of
course, admissibility may be denied if the weight of prejudicial inferences is greater than




The various levels of abstraction of words produce ambigu-
ity. For example, to convey the idea that one can get from one
location to another, one may say, "I own an object with wheels,"
or, "I own a car." The first statement conveys far less infor-
mation than the second. An object with wheels might be a car,
roller skates, a motorcycle, or a bicycle. Yet, the term "car" is
itself something of an abstraction. Is the car old or new? Is it
a sedan or a van? The more details one omits the more abstract
one becomes. Abstraction is "saying less and less about more
and more."
47
Certain words are inherently more abstract than others. Con-
sider the words "love," "cafeteria," and "dime," words which
differ in their level of abstraction. If a speaker says, "I am in
love," a listener would have little or no ability to know what
the speaker intends to encompass by the term "love." "Love"
is an abstract emotion each of us interprets differently according
to our own experiences. For some, the term will convey tend-
erness and warmth; for others, sadness; for still others, anger.
Thus, if we are asked to draw inferences about John's conduct
from evidence that John said, "I love Mary," these inferences
are as likely to come from ourselves as from any meaning that
John intended to convey.
"Cafeteria" is certainly a less abstract term than "love."
That is, many details of a speaker's cafeteria are likely to match
those of any listener. Nevertheless, the word is abstract enough
that ample room for misunderstanding remains. For example,
assume that a hearsay assertion purports to describe certain
events that occurred in a cafeteria. Knowing the appearance and
atmosphere of the cafeteria might be important in evaluating
the trustworthiness of the assertion. The speaker's cafeteria might
be crowded, dark, and noisy-the listener's quite different. For
this purpose, then, the term "cafeteria" is rather ambiguous.
Many terms, of course, are almost never ambiguous. The
word "dime," for instance, is one to which the speaker and
hearer will almost always attach identical meanings. In general,
,7 MYERs, supra note 35, at 61.
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tangibles are less abstract than intangibles; 48 words that group
together many details are more abstract than those that refer to
fewer details. Although there is no bright dividing line, the more
abstract a term, the greater the likelihood of ambiguity.
Interestingly, personal communication experts recommend a
trial-like approach to ambiguity problems caused by abstraction:
"Check it out." That is, they suggest that the way to clear up
uncertainty is to ask follow-up questions designed to elicit the
speaker's actual meaning. 49 This advice is akin to telling attor-
neys to cross-examine the hearsay speaker if they believe that
testimony is ambiguous. Of course, this is precisely the option
attorneys do not have when the hearsay declarant is unavailable.
This discussion of abstraction recalls the earlier distinction
between structural ambiguity and ambiguity that depends on the
use to which an assertion is put.5 0 Although a term's abstractness
does not vary with context, context may well determine whether
the potential ambiguity is important. Examine these two state-
ments, assuming both are offered to support the declarant's
ability to identify Jones:
1. I was sitting next to the window when Jones sat down
next to me.
2. I was able to see Jones by looking out the window.
The second statement compels the trier of fact to infer a
great many unspoken details about the window to believe that
the declarant's identification of Jones is reliable. How large was
the window? Was it open or closed? What was the quality of
the glass? Was it as filthy as this author's office window? Was
there glare? In the context of the second sentence, the details
subsumed in the term "window" are important. The declarant's
ability to identify Jones depends on whether the declarant's
window matches those conjured up in the mind of the trier of
fact. In the first sentence, by contrast, the window serves only
to locate the declarant at a particular point. The window's details
,1 H. HAcKErr, M. ANDERSON, S. FESSENDEN & L. HAGEN, UNDERSTANDING AND
BEING UNDERSTOOD 139 (1957).
49 J. MAKAY & B. GAW, PERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL COMfUNICATION 110-11
(1975).
10 See supra notes 35, 40 and accompanying text.
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matter little, and therefore the ambiguities are not as important
as they are in the context of the second assertion.
Because the importance of ambiguity depends greatly on the
use to which parties put an abstract term, a general rule such
as, "Assertions containing ambiguous terminology are not ad-
missible," would accomplish little. At its core, the problem of
ambiguity involves a statement's relevance as much as it does its
hearsay features. For this reason, problems of ambiguity often
are best addressed to the court's sound discretion under Federal
Rule 403. 11 The more abstract an assertion is, and the more the
details subsumed in an abstract term are important to disputed
issues, the greater the risk of ambiguity, and the less the pro-
bative value. The court must weigh this reduced probative value
against the potential prejudice of the jury giving unintended
meaning to an assertion. The key to the sound exercise of
discretion lies in a court's recognizing the degree of risk of
ambiguity.
B. Polarity
People frequently begin the description of an event, emotion,
or phenomenon by confessing that, "Words alone cannot ex-
press. . . ." Such a confession recognizes that our language is
often poorly suited to the complex world in which we live. In
fact, the language of a cultural group often can be a clue to the
importance of some aspect of the culture. For example, Eskimos
have words to describe 18 different kinds of snow. The Navaho
use different terminology to convey the idea that it is raining,
depending on whether the speaker knows it is raining because
the speaker went outside and got wet, or because the speaker
looked outside and saw it rain, or because someone told the
speaker it was raining. By comparison, the English language has
words that describe many different kinds of garbage.5 2 To the
extent that our language does not contain ready-made terms to
describe subtle (yet possibly important) nuances and shadings
that we know exist in the real world, our language is polar. That
is, we have words that describe the opposite ends of complex
" See supra note 14.
N hmRs, supra note 35, at 63-66.
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reality, but no words for all the meanings in between. As a
result, a speaker may choose the polar term that more closely
fits what she experienced. The term, however, may be only a
clue to the reality, not the reality itself.
The English language is replete with words which describe
the world in polar terms.13 Examine the list of polar opposites
below, and try to think of a word which expresses a middle
point between each pair of words, as "gray" expresses a middle










One is likely to have difficulty finding the one word which
captures the middle ground in these examples. Yet, ironically,
most people or events that we use language to describe generally
fall into this middle ground. That is, most people are neither
totally stingy nor totally generous. Our behavior typically con-
sists of elements of safety and dangerousness. Yet, we have no
readily available single words to describe these gradations.
Because our language is characterized by polarization, asser-
tions are frequently at least two steps removed from reality. The
mere act of describing an event in verbal terms is one step away
from reality; polarization creates a further distortion. The first
distortion is inherent in any symbolic language system.
Polarization can be overcome if people recognize the tendency
" Id. at 71 (people "tend to think, and therefore to speak, in terms of opposites
in our language"). See also H. DEAN & K. BRYSON, E3'mcvaV COmmaumCATION 61 (2d
ed. 1961) (English is an "either-or" language and tends to cause people to perceive
others as equal or unequal, dependent or independent, and to label statements as true
or false); J. PEARSON, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 67 (1982) ("Polarization is the
error of mistaking contraries (the phenomena between which there is "middle ground")
for contradictories (two phenomena which are authentic dichotomies)").
14 With slight modification, the chart is from MYERS, supra note 35, at 71.
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of our language to divide the world into polar opposites and
take the time to explain what they really mean. Speakers are
likely, however, to take the easy way out by choosing a polar
term in preference to a more accurate, but longer-winded, de-
scription.- As a result, many assertions are ambiguous in that
the declarant's words often will not reflect reality, but rather a
distortion toward one of a pair of polar opposites.
C. Unconventional Meanings
A third cause of ambiguity lies in the tendency of many
persons to use language unconventionally. Grammarians differ-
entiate between standard and nonstandard language communi-
ties. 56 The former, including most lawyers and judges, use
language largely in conformity with the formal rules and usage
conventions of the English language. Many more persons, how-
ever, speak nonstandard, or "popular," English. The nonstand-
ard English takes a variety of forms, including slang, jargon,
regionalisms, and colloquialisms. Particular nonstandard uses of
words may vary among different cultural groups, age groups,
sexual groups, occupations, and levels of education, to name
just a few. But whatever the category, the use of nonstandard
English creates potential misunderstanding between speakers and
listeners. For example, the sentence, "The seat covers were in a
plain wrapper," might be understood by most speakers of stand-
ard English in one way. If the speaker is a truck driver, for
whom a "seat cover" is a female occupant of a car and a "plain
wrapper" is an unmarked police car, the sentence has an entirely
different meaning.
57
Hence, when confronted with hearsay assertions, judges must
be aware that a speaker's nonstandard language might have a
different meaning from their own formal English. The witness
who repeats an assertion in court may be unable to clarify the
potential ambiguity. First, the witness may not use language in
the same nonstandard way as the declarant. Second, even if the
witness is a member of the same language subgroup, there are
" Id. at 72.
DEAN & BRYSON, supra note 53, at 139.
7 The example is taken from PEARSON, supra note 53, at 64.
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obvious evidentiary difficulties in asking the witness what the
declarant really meant to say in standard English. Short of
calling an expert witness, a court may have to recognize that the
potential ambiguity might make the assertion inadmissible.
D. Form vs. Function
Ambiguity may also arise because the intended function of
an assertion may not be identical to the function suggested by
its form. Linguists have identified five forms and functions of
language: expressive, designative, interrogative, evaluative, and
directive.58 An expressive statement refers to the speaker's inter-
nal state: "I am hungry." A designative statement refers to
events or conditions external to the speaker: "We are close to
food." An interrogative statement asks for information either
about someone's internal state or about external events or con-
ditions: "Are you hungry?" or "Are we close to food?" An
evaluative statement makes a value judgment: "The food is
good." Finally, a directive statement orders action: "Bring me
food."
Confusion results when the form of a statement is at variance
with its intended function. People often make statements in a
form that does not match the intended function. The result is
the frequent expression of exasperation, "Why don't people say
what they mean?" For instance, recall the designative statement
above, "We are close to food." This, in form at least, is typical
of assertions offered under the "catch-all" hearsay exceptions.
The form, however, may be misleading. Instead of a designative
function, the speaker might have intended to indicate that he
was hungry; or that he was demanding food; or that the nearby
food was good; or that he was wondering if food was close by.
Although the assertion was in designative form, it potentially
could have been intended to fulfill any of the other functions
and, thereby, take on a drastically different meaning.
E. Chronology
At trial, witnesses typically testify to events in chronological
order. 9 There is good reason for this: the order in which events
" Makay & Gaw, supra note 49, at 104.
"See P. BERGMAN, TRiAL ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL 69 (1975); J. TANroRD, THE
TRAL PROCESS 346 (1983).
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happen is a key determinant in the inferences that one will draw
from these events.1° For example, assume a witness testifies,
"Jones was driving 60 m.p.h.; Jones hit a pedestrian." Unless
we know whether Jones was speeding prior to or after hitting
the pedestrian, we cannot logically infer whether speeding con-
tributed to the mishap. Perhaps Jones hit the pedestrian and
sped away at 60. Lawyers often are careful to elicit stories in
sequential order, because they want to shape the inferences that
triers of fact draw from evidence.
Outside the courtroom, however, people are prone to disre-
gard chronology when describing events; 61 a disregard that is
likely to be particularly pronounced in hearsay situations. Most
hearsay assertions offered in court, it is fair to say, are not
detail-laden descriptions of events. They are more likely.to con-
sist of a brief sentence or two, the brevity often serving to mask
chronological sequence. Even when a declarant mentions events
in sequence, his failure to describe additionally the length of
time of and between events also may create inferential uncer-
tainty. In the example above, for instance, assume that the
declarant had stated, "Jones was driving 60 m.p.h., and then
Jones struck a pedestrian." Most persons in hearing this readily
would form an image of Jones speeding along and being unable
to stop in time to avoid striking a pedestrian. To make that
inference, however, we must superimpose our own chronology
on the statement, a chronology which has Jones speeding im-
mediately prior to colliding with the pedestrian. If the declarant
had been referring to Jones' speed five or ten minutes prior to
the time of the collision, the inference is far less certain.
Chronological uncertainty, then, is a frequent cause of am-
biguity. The less clearly the order of events can be perceived
from an assertion, the less certain the listener can be of receiving
the same message that the speaker intended to send.
F. Filling
Filling is a psychological phenomenon that occurs whenever
we listen to another's story. The term refers to our natural
See BINDER & BERGMAN, supra note 43, at 12, 266.
Id. at 264 (because witnesses not likely "on their own to describe discrete events
sequentially," one must consciously urge them to do so).
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tendency to amplify stories by adding details and meanings to
them. The details and meanings may well not be those a declar-
ant meant to convey, but rather a product of each hearer's
personal experiences. The stories of each will be different be-
cause both speaker and listener have unique past experiences.
We have little control over our tendency to fill; filling is a
mental process that "allows the expectancy arising from past
experience to become the actuality of present experience....
The human mind works in this fashion; nothing can be done to
change that.'"62
To understand this phenomenon, examine the following as-
sertion, "Jones robbed Smith at gunpoint." In your mind, for-
mulate a story of what happened, based upon this assertion.
Even better, write a brief narrative account of the event, or
draw a diagram. Undoubtedly you will be able to do all of these
things, even though the assertion is virtually void of detail. Your
past experience will provide the setting of the robbery, the sexes
of the robber and victim, and a myriad of surrounding details.
Filling is unique among the ambiguity factors. All of the
factors discussed above are traceable to the lack of opportunity
to ask questions of a declarant. The filling phenomenon is more
pervasive; it suggests that even if we could elicit additional
information from a declarant, we would still tend to embellish
a story with details drawn from our own experiences. We react
not simply to an assertion, but to an assertion with its "pen-
umbra" of meaning supplied by us. Filling thus serves both as
a cause of ambiguity and as a reason why we are less apt to
detect it. Filling creates ambiguity by allowing for as many
different interpretations of a statement as there are triers of fact.
Filling also conceals the ambiguity by allowing each of us to
think that we know what a statement means. For example, in
their book on interviewing techniques, Binder and Price advise
lawyers to be aware of filling, so that they can understand a
client's story rather than one drawn partially from their own
experiences and expectancies. 63 Unless lawyers and judges con-
sciously are aware of this phenomenon, they will fill in the




meaning of hearsay assertions and fail to recognize ambiguity.
G. Conclusion
The factors described above suggest that ambiguity may arise
apart from any insincere intent on the part of a speaker and
apart from a speaker's having been raised by a remote cultural
group that speaks no English. Ambiguity derives from inherent
characteristics of our spoken language combined with our psy-
chological makeup. Far from being a makeweight argument that
rarely comes into play, it signifies an independent danger that
only cross-examination could go far toward obviating.
From the standpoint of hearsay doctrine, these ambiguity
factors suggest a number of possibilities. The first, rejection of
all hearsay from witnesses who are not in court, all probably
would reject. We cannot have a system that relies heavily on the
verbal telling of events while at the same time rejecting all
evidence that shares the universal potential to be ambiguous.
The second possibility is to admit hearsay despite its ambiguity
and rely on jurors, aided by argument of counsel, to discount
it appropriately. This may be sufficient when the ambiguity is
plain on its face and the probative value of a legitimate inter-
pretation outweighs the potential prejudicial effect of an erro-
neous one. Many of the factors noted above, however, are not
intuitively obvious; a juror or even a judge may well overvalue
an assertion that in reality is ambiguous. This leads to the third
possibility, a ruling that a hearsay assertion is inadmissible due
to its ambiguous nature. Although it is impossible to define
abstractly which hearsay assertions are most likely to be inad-
missible, courts should at least be prepared to make such rulings
in appropriate cases. At present, however, courts show little or
no inclination to do so. Section III summarizes the factors courts
have discussed when determining the admissibility of hearsay
under the "catch-all" exceptions.
III. TRusTWoRTimIEss AND THE RESIDUAL HEARSAY
EXCEPTIONS
Recall that the impetus for judicial analysis of hearsay in
terms of the rationale for its exclusion was given by the adoption
of Rules 803(24) and 804(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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These "catch-all exceptions" provide that, although a hearsay
statement is not made admissible by any established hearsay
exception, a judge may admit the statement if it has "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." 64 Prior to the
adoption of these rules, the admissibility of hearsay depended
largely on whether a statement qualified under one of an array
of specific exceptions. 65 When a statement is offered under one
of the specific exceptions, analysis generally is confined to whether
the particular foundational requirements of an exception have
been satisfied. For example, when a statement is offered as a
"dying declaration, '66 a court will analyze, among other things,
whether the declarant believed death was imminent, rather than
whether the statement is free from underlying hearsay dangers.
The "catch-all" exceptions, however, eliminate the security of
required foundations in favor of a general "trustworthiness"
standard, 67 encouraging courts to analyze hearsay according to
its underlying dangers.
Ambiguity, however, has been notably absent from the ad-
missibility analysis under the "catch-all" exceptions. The appel-
" FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(5). See supra note I.
65 Notes of Committee on the Judiciary Senate Report No. 93-1277. The committee
stated that for certain exceptional circumstances a rule should be enacted to allow
trustworthy evidence, not included within the listed hearsay exceptions, to be admitted.
In support of this proposition the committee cited Dallas County v. Commercial Union
Assoc. Co. Ltd., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961), which involved the issue of whether a
copy of a local newspaper could be introduced to show that a fire had occurred in the
courthouse 50 years earlier. The court held that the newspaper did not qualify for
admission because it did not fit within any of the recognized hearsay exceptions including
qualification as a business record or as an ancient document. The court did find,
however, that the article was trustworthy. Id.
- See FED. R. Evro. 804(b)(2).
61 The "catch-alls" do contain foundational elements in addition to trustworthi-
ness. For example, FED. R. EviD. 804(5) unlike FED. R. EvID. 803(24) requires that the
hearsay declarant be unavailable. Because the latter, however, requires a hearsay offeror
to secure non-hearsay evidence "through reasonable efforts," as a practical matter,
unavailability is probably required under each rule. See M. Gruuws, EVMENCE 239
(1983). Under the "catch-alls," a hearsay assertion must be relevant to a material fact,
more probative than any other evidence the proponent can reasonably procure, and
offered only after notice has been given to opposing counsel. Also, its admission must
be in the interests of justice. Because these elements do little more than restate general
principles of evidence, they have had "no appreciable impact upon the application of
the residual exception(s)." MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 324.1, at 909. Trustworthiness,
then, is the hallmark of admissibility under the "catch-alls."
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late court opinions suggest that ambiguity is rarely considered
an element of trustworthiness. It may be, of course, that trial
judges are so alert to the danger of ambiguity that all ambiguous
utterances are weeded out at trial, but this seems unlikely. If
anything, the narrative danger historically has been regarded as
the least significant of the hearsay dangers, making its rigorous
application unlikely. Moreover, appellate courts usually do not
even mention the narrative danger in their discussions of hearsay
admissibility. This slighting may be because courts tend to ex-
amine the surrounding "external" circumstances when attempt-
ing to discern if the hearsay is trustworthy, an examination that
overlooks ambiguity, which often has little or nothing to do
with the external circumstances surrounding the making of a
statement.
The general absence of ambiguity analysis may be due, in
part, to the courts' general tendency to apply the residual excep-
tions rather liberally to permit the admission of hearsay evidence
that would have been inadmissible under the more narrowly
drawn hearsay exceptions. 68 Whether the "catch-all" exceptions
should have been engrafted onto the list of at least twenty-nine
other hearsay exceptions was a hotly contested issue in Congress.
The Senate, the driving force behind adoption of the "catch-
all" exceptions, noted in its Report that, "It is intended that
the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only
in exceptional circumstances. ' 69 Although one could not say
accurately that the "catch-all" exceptions have totally eviscer-
ated the hearsay rule, neither could one state accurately that
these exceptions are applied only "very rarely." Noting that the
"very rarely" language does hot appear in the language of the
statutes, courts have embarked on a case-by-case analysis of
whether a particular hearsay statement is "trustworthy." As one
commentator has remarked, "Judicial enthusiasm for the resid-
ual exceptions mocks the caution of Congress. ' 70 Judicial aware-
ness of the danger of ambiguity may do little to remove the
welcome mat that hearsay tends to receive; but that awareness
" See McCoImcK, supra note 2, § 327, at 917.
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMN. NEws 7051, 7066.
71 Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 A.B.A. (LrrirATiON) 13, 17 (1983).
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may bar the admissibility of untrustworthy hearsay in appropri-
ate cases. In addition, lawyers' and judges' awareness of the
danger of ambiguity may prevent triers of fact from overesti-
mating the reliability of admitted hearsay.
We come, then, to a review of the factors courts have
identified in their search for "equivalent trustworthiness," a
search that undoubtedly would bring a smile to the Mona Lisa's
lips. The specifically enacted exceptions vary not only in the
trustworthiness of the hearsay they typically make admissible,
but also each exception individually authorizes the admissibility
of hearsay that runs a wide gamut of trustworthiness. For ex-
ample, one is likely to believe that birth and death certificates
are highly trustworthy,7' at least when compared to an "excited
utterance." 7 As to the latter's trustworthiness, psychologists tell
us that under stressful conditions, person's reports may be sin-
cere, but that excitement reduces perceptual abilities. 73 No matter
how well-established the exception, the trustworthiness of a state-
ment that often begins with "Oh my God!" is doubtful. Many
other examples could be given to illustrate the variation in trust-
worthiness of statements admitted under different established
hearsay exceptions.
Moreover, two assertions that qualify for admission under
the same statutory exception may vary widely in trustworthiness.
When evidence, whether hearsay or not, is offered, judges typ-
ically do not evaluate its trustworthiness-that is a jury question.
Therefore, when a hearsay assertion is offered, for example, as
an excited utterance, a judge will do little more than determine
whether an event was "startling" and whether the statement was
made "under the stress of excitement." The judge probably will
give short shrift to an argument that, although the statement
complies with these foundational elements, its lack of trustwor-
71 See FED. R. EviD. 803(9) (records of vital statistics admissable if report made
pursuant to requirements of law).
See FED. R. Ev'rD. 803(2) (statement relating to startling event or condition
admissible if made while declarant under stress of excitement by event or condition).
71 E. LoFrus, Emwmn~ss TasTImo~v 33 (1979). The role that stress plays on a
witness at the point of perception is captured in the Yerkes-Dodson law, named in honor
of the two men who first noted it in 1908. "The law states basically that strong
motivational states such as stress or other emotional arousal facilitate learning and
performance up to a point, after which there is a decrement." Id.
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thiness renders it inadmissible. 74 Thus, two excited utterances,
one seemingly highly accurate, the other reeking of mendacity,
may be equally admissible under the excited utterance exception.
A judge, urged to admit a statement under the residual
exceptions, may get a strained neck looking for equivalent trust-
worthiness because of each type of admissibility variation. Need
a statement be as trustworthy as a birth certificate, or may a
judge look for the lowest common denominator, whichever ex-
ception she considers it to be? If the latter, may she look further
to the least trustworthy hearsay that the exception might make
admissible?
Not surprisingly, there would be little consensus on the an-
swers to these questions. Consensus, however, may not be nec-
essary. The specific exceptions are nothing if not a pragmatic
collection of principles that developed largely independently of
each other. That is, the excited utterance exception probably
developed because judges considered statements made under
stressful conditions to be generally trustworthy, not because
"excited utterances" were equivalent to "dying declarations."
Therefore, judges are following in their common law ancestors'
footsteps if they look to the trustworthiness of particular asser-
tions that are before them and do not attempt to rate them
against a mythical standard of equivalency. As one authority
suggests: "Generally, however, the question [of equivalency] has
not been raised in terms, and a sort of consensus average seems
to be assumed."
'75
If comparison shopping is out, how is a court to decide
whether an assertion offered under the "catch-all" exceptions is
as trustworthy as those typically offered under the recognized
exceptions? The logical way, it appears, is to analyze the trust-
worthiness of an assertion in terms of the hearsay dangers that
the exclusionary rule protects against in the first place. That is,
74 This is not always the case, however. Certain hearsay exceptions do require
judges to determine that an assertion is trustworthy as a condition of admissibility. For
example, when an assertion is offered as a "declaration against interest" by a defendant
in a criminal case, the judge must find the statement trustworthy before it can be
admitted. See FED. R. Evro. 804(b)(3). Usually, however, trustworthiness is a concern
exclusive to juries.
11 McCoancK, supra note 2, § 324.1, at 908.
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an out-of-court assertion made under circumstances that obviate
all hearsay risks would qualify for admission under the "catch-
all" exceptions. This seems to be the case, for example, with
marriage certificates, one of the recognized hearsay exceptions.
76
Clergypeople and public officials undoubtedly are sincere when
they record the names of a married couple; the record is suffi-
ciently concise to allay fears of ambiguity; the record is prepared
so close in time to the ceremony that memory problems are
minimal; and the person who performs a ceremony is unlikely
to have problems perceiving who has married. An assertion
offered under the "catch-all" exceptions that similarly over-
comes the traditional risks also should qualify as trustworthy.
To demand that assertions offered under the "catch-all"
exceptions overcome all hearsay risks, however, would demand
more than is required under many of the recognized exceptions.
For example, an assertion offered as a "declaration against
interest' 77 is likely to be sincerely made because most people do
not make statements lightly that could harm them.7 8 Also, the
assertion must be sufficiently unambiguous so that it is inter-
preted as being against the speaker's interest. 79 On the other
hand, memory and perceptual difficulties remain. One may ques-
tion whether a speaker recalls the event accurately because the
assertion offered as against interest may be made long after the
event to which it refers. Also, the fact that a speaker makes an
assertion against her interest is no guarantee that she accurately
perceived the events giving rise to the assertion. 0
Conversely, consider an assertion offered as a "then existing
mental condition.''" If the assertion reflects a concurrent mental
state, the speaker is likely to have little difficulty perceiving his
own mental state. Also, the concurrency eliminates any memory
problems. Concurrency, however, is certainly no guarantee that
76 FED. R. EvlD. 803(12) (statement of fact in marriage certificate admissible if
certificate issued within reasonable time of act).
FED. R. EvmD. 804(b)(3).
78 Id.
7 Id.
10 See Tribe, supra note 13, at 964-65 (declarant unaware of "substantial defects
of memory and perception of which a declarant cannot be conscious").
81 FED. R. EviD. 803(3).
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the person is sincerely reporting his mental state or that the
words he uses to report it are not ambiguous.
2
Hence, a judge trying to decide whether an assertion qualifies
under the "catch-all" exceptions seemingly should be satisfied
if an assertion, like declarations against interest and assertions
of mental state, overcomes two of the four hearsay dangers. In
fact, although the specific statutory exceptions are not models
of consistency, one general theme is that many overcome two,
but only two, of the hearsay dangers.8 3 Thus, one may consider
assertions that overcome two dangers to have "equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Probing the recog-
nized exceptions a bit further, however, one sees that the hearsay
dangers are not fungible; it seems incorrect that "overcoming
any two will do." Instead, as Tribe noted, the hearsay dangers
are paired off consistently. One pair, the "left leg" of Tribe's
"Testimonial Triangle," consists of the dangers of sincerity and
faulty narration, dangers which require one to consider whether
an assertion accurately reflects a declarant's belief. The "right
leg" pair consists of the dangers of memory and perception,
dangers which require one to consider whether an assertion
accurately reflects reality. The recognized hearsay exceptions
tend to overcome one danger leg, but not the other. Hence,
Tribe can point to strong "left leg" exceptions such as those for
statements of medical history to a physician, excited utterances,
and business records; and strong "right leg" exceptions such as
statements of presently existing mental state.
84
What is initially interesting about the trend of decisions
under the "catch-all" exceptions is that they depart from the
"left leg-right leg" groupings identified by Tribe. Instead of
thinking about "one good leg," judges typically examine the
factual circumstances in each case that seem to affect the trus-
tworthiness of a hearsay assertion. United States v. Hinkson
5
exemplifies the usual analysis. In Hinkson, the defendant, "Crazy
Fred," was charged with murder. The prosecution's theory was
2 For example, is there any more ambiguous response in our culture than that
typical reply to the question, "How are you?", "Fine"?
- See Tribe, supra note 13, at 966.
Id. at 964-65.
632 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1980).
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that "Crazy Fred" killed the victim as part of an attempt to
become the leader of a motorcycle gang, believing that commit-
ting a murder would prove his high qualifications for the posi-
tion. The defendant offered hearsay evidence that a third party
had confessed to the murder under one of the "catch-all" ex-
ceptions, Rule 803(24).86 The appellate court held that evidence
of the confession was not trustworthy and that the district judge
had properly excluded it. The court noted that the alleged con-
fessor delighted in aggrandizing himself with his biker image,
and thus the confession might have been little more than brag-
gadocio. Moreover, no physical evidence connected the alleged
confessor to the crime, and the confession conflicted with other
evidence.
7
Thus, the analysis for admissibility of hearsay under the
"catch-all" exceptions is very different than under one of the
specific statutory exceptions. When hearsay is offered pursuant
to the latter, courts tend to look not at an assertion's trustwor-
thiness, but at whether it satisfies foundational criteria. When
hearsay is offered under the "catch-all" exceptions, courts dis-
cuss trustworthiness rather than possible foundational criteria
such as the "left leg-right leg" distinction. Not surprisingly, the
factors courts discuss when determining trustworthiness track
the dangers that first gave rise to the hearsay rule-with the
exception of ambiguity. Consider the McCormick textbook's
summary of factors courts rely on when determining whether a
statement qualifies under the catch-all exceptions:
[A]s the volume of decided cases increases, certain recurring
factors are acquiring recognition as significant in deciding
whether to apply the residual exception. Among them are:
whether the statement was under oath, the duration of the
time lapse between event and statement, motivation to speak
truthfully or otherwise, and whether declarant had firsthand
knowledge. These are factors that ... fairly fall within the
Id. at 383, 384. The statement did not qualify as a declaration against interest
because the alleged confessor was not unavailable and, in fact, testified at the trial,




description equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness .1
Next, consider how closely these factors track the hearsay
dangers. "Whether a statement was made under oath" is a factor
that primarily affects the sincerity of a statement.8 9 If there is
any benefit to the oath at all,9° it is its role as a subtle reminder
to a witness of the solemn nature of her testimony and the
potential charge of perjury. If the oath accomplishes its role, it
goads a witness into making a statement that accurately reflects
her belief and, therefore, guards against the risk of insincerity.
The second factor is "the duration of the time lapse between
event and statement.''91 The factor that considers the time be-
tween an event and a statement obviously is aimed at guarding
against the risk of faulty memory. For example, the case of
United States v. White92 discussed the admissibility of a hearsay
declaration made three months after an event. Holding the state-
ment admissible under Rule 803(24), the court commented:
We have recognized that the length of time between an event
and the declarant's statement concerning it is a significant
indicator of reliability, noting that when an instrument is ex-
" McCoRMCK, supra note 2, § 324.1, at 908 (citations omitted). For a similar
summary, see United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir. 1982), where the
court stated:
In making this [trustworthiness] determination the trial court should con-
sider the declarant's relationship with both the defendant and the govern-
ment, the declarant's motivation to testify before the grand jury, the extent
to which the testimony reflects the declarant's personal knowledge, whether
the declarant has ever recanted the testimony, and the existence of corro-
borating evidence available for cross-examination.
This list omits mentioning the danger of faulty memory. Perhaps that is because Barlow
involved the admissibility of grand jury testimony, which undoubtedly was not given
closely following the events described in the testimony. As the McCormick treatise makes
clear, however, faulty memory is typically a trustworthiness concern.
"' MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 324.1, at 908.
- The philosopher Beccaria suggested that the oath be abolished because its only
function was to force people to commit perjury. C. BEccMAA, ON CRmss AND PUIst-
MEwNTS XI, "Oaths" (1769). He stated: "Laws and the natural sentiments of man
contradict one another when oaths are administered to the accused, binding him to be
truthful when he can best serve his own interests by being false." Id.
N' McCoRmCK, supra note 2, § 324.1, at 908.
611 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ecuted close in time to the event which is the subject of the
statement there is little danger of lost recollection.93
The third factor cited in the McCormick treatise is the "mo-
tivation to speak truthfully or otherwise." This is a direct
reference to the risk of insincerity, because motive may produce
a story that does not sincerely reflect the speaker's belief.
9 4
The final factor cited by McCormick, "whether the declarant
had firsthand knowledge," 95 is a bit more difficult to classify.
In part, the requirement of firsthand knowledge has nothing
whatsoever to do with the hearsay rule. The rule that a lay
witness cannot testify unless he or she has personal knowledge
of events is "more ancient than the hearsay rule."' 96 To this
extent, "firsthand knowledge" speaks to the requirement that
the declarant must have perceived personally whatever her as-
sertion describes, and not to the risk of faulty perception. For
example, the court in United States v. Carlson97 seemed to have
the basic requirement of percipiency in mind rather than the
hearsay danger of faulty perception when it held a hearsay
assertion admissible under Rule 804(b)(5), stating "Tindall was
relating facts surrounding a cocaine transaction in which he
participated and of which he possessed firsthand knowledge;
therefore, there was no reliance upon potentially erroneous sec-
ondary information . .. 98
Courts also use firsthand knowledge as an indication that an
assertion is free from the danger of faulty perception. For ex-
ample, the Carlson court reasoned that, because the declarant
related information about a transaction in which he had partic-
ipated, "the possibility of faulty recollection was minimized." 99
91 Id. at 538.
94 See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 324.1, at -908.
95 Id.
9 Id. at § 247, at 731. See, e.g., State v. Conway, 171 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1943)
(testimony of officer not admissible concerning money in possession of accused when
arrested, apparently based on reports of others); Robertson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
of Walla Walla, Wash., 247 P.2d 217 (Or. 1952) (testimony of bottling plant manager
not admissible as to strength and thickness of glass in bottle based upon measurements
made by third parties).





Similarly, in United States v. Barlow, 100 the court admitted grand
jury testimony against the defendant under the residual exception
in Rule 804(b)(5). The court noted that the declarant had per-
sonal knowledge, and then stated, "This information, however,
was within her [declarant's] personal knowledge .... [T]he
likelihood that Ms. Humphries' recollection was faulty is clearly
remote. Given the events of the days surrounding the theft she
undoubtedly would have recalled whether the appellant was with
her on the night in question."''
These cases indicate that the factors courts typically discuss
when determining trustworthiness are responsive to the dangers
of faulty memory, faulty perception, and insincerity. Ambiguity,
however, seemingly was left at the station when the trustworthi-
ness train pulled out. Nevertheless, ambiguity may render an
assertion untrustworthy even if the remaining dangers have been
overcome. Tribe's "left leg-right leg" image is one way to ca-
tegorize the hearsay dangers. Another is to view the risks of
faulty memory and perception and the risk of insincerity as
"external" risks-risks that can be evaluated by looking at
circumstances surrounding the making of a statement. How much
time elapsed between event and assertion? Did the declarant
have a motive to distort? Was the assertion made under oath?
Did the declarant have a good opportunity to perceive the event
described in the assertion? Each of these questions can be rea-
sonably answered by looking at the environment in which an
assertion is made, but none addresses the issue of whether an
assertion is reasonably free from ambiguity. Because courts do
not explicitly analyze assertions for their potential ambiguity,
the critical distinction between ambiguity and the other three
hearsay dangers makes it unlikely that ambiguity is considered
even implicitly when courts determine trustworthiness under the
"catch-all" exceptions.
This essay has attempted to explain why ambiguity is a
legitimate hearsay risk. Indeed, ambiguity is built into the very
existence of a symbolic language system. It is inconceivable,
however, that the inherent ambiguity of language is a sufficient
,. 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982).
II Id. at 965.
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basis to consider hearsay untrustworthy. At the very least, such
a rule would bar all hearsay from non-testifying declarants.
Therefore, this essay further has attempted to identify particular
aspects of our language that might serve as a guide to assertions
that run more than a routine narrative risk. To test the utility
of these aspects, the remainder of the essay focuses on a few
cases in which hearsay was admitted under one of the residual
exceptions, and in which the narrative risk has gone largely or
completely unnoticed. It then considers the degree to which the
factors described in Section II indicate that the assertions were
ambiguous. The cases chosen are not "cripples," ripe for an
ambiguity kill. Each was selected because it admitted hearsay
and is in some sense "leading," either because it is cited often
in other cases, or because it is cited in widely used treatises or
casebooks. If analysis aided by the "ambiguity factors" suggests
that amibiguity was a legitimate risk in this limited milieu, then
the ambiguity danger is one that deserves regular consideration
by courts. Admittedly, the analysis will be incomplete. One
cannot conclude that an assertion is definitely untrustworthy
because of ambiguity any more than one can conclude definitely
that a declarant had insufficient memory or spoke insincerely.
Admissibility of hearsay, whether under a statutory or a residual
exception, involves a balancing of probative value versus poten-
tial prejudice, a function left to the trial court's sound discretion.
IV. AMBIGUITY EXITS THE HEARSAY CLOSET
Consider Huff v. White Motor Corp.'02 Huff died when his
truck-tractor sideswiped a guardrail, collided with an overpass
support and burst into flames. Huff's widow filed suit against
the vehicle's manufacturer, alleging that the truck's defective
design caused the fuel to ignite. 10 3 One issue on appeal was the
admissibility of a statement Huff made to a friend while in the
hospital a few days after the tragedy. In the statement, Huff
said that "as he was approaching the curve or starting into it
his pant leg was on fire and he was trying to put his pant leg
out and lost control and hit the bridge abutment and then the
02 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979).
103 Id. at 289.
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truck was on fire."'0 The defendant sought to introduce the
statement as evidence that the fire was not caused by any defec-
tive vehicle design. 05 The appellate court held that, if on retrial
Huff were found to be lucid when he made the statement, it
was trustworthy and should have been admitted by the trial
court. 106
Assume that the plaintiff's counsel in Huff had objected to
the admissibility of Huff's statement on the ground that the
statement was ambiguous. Because a pre-collision fire in the cab
suggests driver negligence rather than a design defect as the
cause of the fuel's ignition, ambiguity in the statement concern-
ing the sequence of events certainly would undercut the state-
ment's trustworthiness. In this regard, note that, according to
the court's summary of the evidence, the truck struck both a
guardrail and a bridge abutment. 0 7 The statement tells us that
the fire had started before the truck hit the bridge abutment.
One cannot glean the sequence of the fire and the collision with
the guardrail from the statement, yet this is the vital chronology.
If striking the guardrail had produced the fire, a manufacturing
defect might well be to blame. 08 This chronological ambiguity
certainly is understandable: the statement was short and spoken
in the hospital by a severely injured person who died of his
injuries a few days later.
The Huff opinion also provides an example of ambiguity
caused by polarity. Fires come in many different sizes and have
many different causes, yet we have few verbal alternatives be-
tween "no fire" and "fire" to describe each variation. Huff's
statement tells us that his pant leg and the truck were both on
fire. Were these the same fire? Did they share a common cause?
The lack of a convenient verbal middle ground available to Huff,
combined with his obviously distressed physical condition which
11, Id. at 290.
, Id.
The court did note in passing that the assertion was "unambiguous." Id. at
292. There is, however, no discussion of ambiguity, whereas the opinion emphasized
sincerity.
1 Id. at 289.
c Although knowing the proximity of the curve in relation to the guardrail and
bridge abuttment might help clear up the chronological ambiguity, this information
cannot be discerned from the court's opinion.
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would have little inclined him to search for just the right phrase,
prevents us from learning more about the fire. If there were
indeed separate fires, events could have happened this way: when
Huff's truck struck the guardrail, igniting gas caught his pant
leg on fire. Huff tried to put it out, lost control, and the truck
struck the bridge abutment. Then another separate fire engulfed
the truck. This interpretation suggests that a manufacturing de-
fect could have been responsible for Huff's death. Did events
occur this way? We do not know-after all, the statement is
ambiguous.
Consider how the "filling" phenomenon may affect a per-
son's reaction to a statement such as the one in Huff. Did a
mental image about how the accident occurred form in your
mind as you read Huff's brief hospital statement? Most likely
it did, and that image might be surprisingly detailed as to the
type of truck, the highway section where the events took place,
etc. Much of that image, of course, is a product of each reader's
own experience rather than anything in the statement. Once that
image forms, it tends to block any ability to see ambiguity-the
statement seems to have clear meaning. It may be, then, that
ambiguity will be detected less often than, say, obvious moti-
vation to slant a story. If attorneys and judges are more alert
to the possibility of ambiguity and to the factors that tend to
produce it, however, the trustworthiness of individual hearsay
assertions will be assessed more accurately.
The above discussion of Huff exemplifies the sort of analysis
judges and attorneys might use to detect and evaluate the risk
of ambiguity. Let us now utilize this analysis in the context of
another case, Bill v. Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co.109 In Bill,
the plaintiffs sought to recover on a life insurance policy cov-
ering the life of their teenage son. The policy was void if the
death was by suicide. The evidence showed that the son, Leroy,
was found dead in a barn's hayloft with twine connecting an
overhead beam to a noose around his neck. The hearsay evidence
in dispute consisted of a conversation between a physician and
Leroy's parents, the beneficiaries under the life insurance policy,
which took place shortly after the discovery of Leroy's body.
101 19 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 1963).
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According to the physician, he asked the father, "Is there any
doubt in your mind that your son committed suicide?" In re-
sponse, the father shook his head back and forth in a lateral
direction. The trial judge had excluded the evidence on the
ground that to admit it as the father's admission would require
the jury to speculate that the head shaking was the equivalent
of a negative response. The appellate court reversed, holding
that the jury could reasonably interpret the father's head motion
as a negative response. 110
Although the appellate court's opinion appears eminently
supportable on its own rationale, I suggest that its discussion
overlooks the more genuinely ambiguous aspects of the evidence.
The issue in the case was not whether Leroy had died by his
own hand, but whether he had done so intentionally. If Leroy
had taken his own life accidentally, or in some other non-
intentional way, the parents were entitled to the proceeds of the
policy. Recall that ambiguity may be produced because many
people use language in unconventional ways. To speakers of
"standard" English, such as physicians and attorneys, the term
"suicide" undoubtedly connotes an intentional act. The plain-
tiffs, however, were farmers; the father's understanding of the
term "suicide" may not have included the requirement that the
death be intentional. It is certainly plausible that the father
considered any way in which Leroy met death by his own hand,
accidentally or not, to be suicide.
Moreover, the "polarization" phenomenon may have con-
tributed to potential ambiguity in Bill. "Suicide" is a term in
our culture that applies to all those who take their own lives.
We lack a ready term for those'who take their own lives unwit-
tingly, accidentally, or in some other fashion. Hence, it is under-
standable that the father simply would have accepted the
physician's terminology, rather than search for different words.
Indeed, in the case's context, it is particularly understandable
because the conversation took place soon after Leroy's death.
Finally, note that the appellate court treated the father's
head motion as a designative statement, the equivalent of the
statement, "There is no doubt in my mind that my son com-
"I Id. at 769-73.
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mitted suicide." Under the circumstances, however, there is a
strong possibility that the father's gesture was an expressive
assertion, an assertion that tells more about the father's internal
feelings than about the way his son died. Entirely eliminate the
gesture, whose possibly speculative character was the focus of
court attention, and assume instead that the father had answered
the physician's query with an audible "no." Given the circum-
stances in which it was made, we easily can regard the response
as an expression of grief over his son's death. "No," in other
words, was the father's way of saying, "I am devastated." This
interpretation is strengthened by the father's failure to make
even an audible response. To see this more clearly, assume the
physician had asked the question another way: "Is there any
doubt in your mind that your son's death was accidental?" and
that the father had shaken his head back and forth. We might
still regard the father's response as more of an expression of
grief than a reply to the doctor's query. If that is the case, the
ambiguous nature of the father's response is clear.
Bill demonstrates that, in some situations, a court's assess-
ment of an assertion's ambiguity may be aided by further foun-
dational inquiry. For example, in Bill, the differences in language
use between professional persons and farmers might have the
tendency to render the father's reference to suicide ambiguous.
But did the father use language in unconventional ways? After
all, many farmers have professional backgrounds. The Bill court
could have considered additional information-it might have
evaluated the father's use of language during his testimony;' it
might have read his deposition, seeking indications of unconven-
tional language use. Acquaintances could have testified about
his use of language. Regarding whether the father's response
was designative or expressive, what was the remainder of the
conversation, if any, between the father and the physician? These
types of inquiry are not uncommon-for example, courts often
need to examine the language ability of a criminal defendant to
decide whether he understood the Miranda warning."12 The foun-
", The father did testify in Bill, but the court discussion does not indicate any
attention to the issues described in this Article. Id. at 772.
,,2 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964) (Court held that an independent
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dational inquiry need not be lengthy or complex, or in some
cases even necessary. Nevertheless, if attorneys and judges are
alert to the danger of ambiguity and are aware of features in
our language that tend to produce ambiguity, some inquiry on
the record into relevant circumstances may help to define how
great the danger is.
A third case for consideration is a wrongful death case,
Robinson v. Shapiro."' Robinson, the decedent, was working
on repairs to a chimney and died when the gate he was holding,
to get from the roof to a stairway, collapsed. The gate was
wedged in place and could not be swung open and then swung
shut. Had the gate been open, getting from the roof to the
stairway would have been routine. With the gate closed, how-
ever, the decedent and other workers had to hang onto it as
they swung themselves onto the stairs. Critical evidence on the
plaintiff's behalf was supplied by a co-worker, who testified
that, prior to his fall, the decedent had stated that the building
superintendent had forbidden the workers to remove the gate
because the closed gate turned the roof area into a makeshift
pen for the superintendent's dog and opening the gate would
allow the dog to escape.' 4 The court upheld the admissibility of
the decedent's statement under the residual exceptions, holding
that it was trustworthy.
1 1 5
Are there narrative dangers in the decedent's statement? One
danger may be based on the tendency to "fill"-to build the
entire transaction between the superintendent and the decedent
based on the decedent's single statement. For example, it is
difficult to know what the supervisor actually said. Perhaps the
supervisor said only that the gate was not to be removed; the
decedent, seeing the dog on the roof, told the co-worker that
the gate was not to be removed because the superintendent was
using it as a pen for the dog. The co-worker, of course, would
determination of constitutional admissibility must be conducted by the trial judge to
determine whether a confession was freely and voluntarily given); Colorado v. Conelly,
55 U.S.L.W. 4043, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986) (Court held that confession by mentally ill
person was voluntary after given Miranda warnings and thus constituted no violation of
the Due Process Clause).
- 646 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1981).
14 Id. at 737-38.
" Id. at 742.
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be unlikely to question the decedent as to who said what. Al-
though this possibility would not seem critical to liability under
the Robinson facts, it does suggest the narrative difficulties that
can arise when filling occurs.
An alternative conversational possibility, also consistent with
the decedent's remarks and also a product of filling, does impact
on the question of liability. Perhaps the decedent asked the
superintendent if the gate could be opened. The superintendent
replied that, because the gate does not swing normally, the
workers could open it only if they walked through and imme-
diately refastened it so the dog could not escape. Because this
procedure is rather complex, the decedent decides that it is better
to leave the gate closed and simply use it as support when
climbing on and off the roof. Rather than report all this, how-
ever, the decedent merely tells his co-worker not to remove the
gate because of the dog. This alternative creates a plausible
description of events, perhaps with different legal consequences.
Because of our tendency to form pictures of events based on
sparse data, however, we tend to not see alternate ways in which
the same event can unfold. The filling problem was particularly
acute in Robinson, because the witness was the co-worker, who
testified to the decedent's version of what the supervisor had
said. Yet, the court engaged in a typical trustworthiness analysis,
focusing on factors external to the statement without examining
potential ambiguity in the statement itself.
This discussion illustrates the ambiguity embedded in the
word "remove." The Robinson court (and perhaps the decedent
as well) interpreted "remove" as indicating that the gate could
not be opened at all. In the context of this case, however, the
term is abstract and polar. The gate might have been removed
for a short or long period of time. Likewise, one could have
removed the gate with or without an intention to restore it to
its wedged condition. There are no ready terms to describe these
potential variations. Because of this, we are uncertain what
meaning the decedent intended to convey to the co-worker.
The hearsay assertions in Huff, Bill, and Robinson are
potentially ambiguous. This is not to say that the assertions
involved in each case were inadmissible. Ambiguity bears on the
trustworthiness of an assertion, and a judge could reason that
in a case's particular circumstances, an assertion is sufficiently
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trustworthy to be admissible in spite of the risk of ambiguity.
By doing so, the judge would be weighing the probative value
of evidence against its potential prejudicial effect. 16 The greater
the risk of ambiguity, the less relevant an assertion becomes; the
less relevant an assertion, the greater the likelihood of prejudicial
impact. When courts engage in this weighing process, we expect
the record to reflect that the judge has exercised his or her
discretion." 7 Only if the record reflects the reasons for a ruling
can one evaluate the way in which discretion was exercised and
be certain that all necessary factors were considered. The ulti-
mate shortcoming of these cases, then, is not that they admit
untrustworthy hearsay. It is that they ignore an important aspect
of the trustworthiness determination.1
8
To return to a thought mentioned in the Introduction, the
rules of evidence try to strike a balance between admitting all
information that would bear on the determination of an issue
and admitting only information with particular earmarks of
trustworthiness. Types of evidence thought to be especially un-
trustworthy-rumor, speculation, hearsay-are excluded because
triers of fact may be tempted to give them greater credence than
they are worth. Ironically, as long as evidence does not fall
within excluded categories of evidence, judges usually admit it
even though its trustworthiness is questionable. For example,
testimony in a personal injury case that the defendant was back-
ing out of her driveway at 50 mph is likely to be admitted, even
though the witness admits to having consumed four martinis
and two Twinkies just before making the observation. This
"" FED. R. Evm. 403. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., People v. Green, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. 1980) (reason for rule is to
furnish appellate court with record necessary for meaningful review of trial court's use
of discretion).
"I Even when an ambiguity issue is recognized by a court, it may not be seen as
an issue that affects trustworthiness. In deMars v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of
the United States, 610 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1979), the court held that a letter from a
physician stating the physician's opinion of the decedent's cause of death was not
trustworthy and was admitted in error by the trial court. It also held, however, that the
.admission was harmless because the letter was ambiguous regarding the cause of death.
Apparently, the deMars court did not perceive that the ambiguity of the letter was itself
a reason to find it untrustworthy.
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evidence "carries the badge of its own weakness," 1 19 and hence
is less likely to be overvalued by triers of fact.
120
It is unclear which approach a court should follow when
determining the admissibility of hearsay under the "catch-all"
exceptions. One might argue that even if hearsay is somewhat
ambiguous, a court should admit it anyway, relying on the jury
to discount its probative worth by reason of the ambiguity. This,
however, would be at odds with the way in which hearsay
normally is handled. Hearsay is one of the strictly excluded
categories of evidence, admissible only if an exception applies.
Therefore, if the foundation for a hearsay exception is lacking
in some respect, the court excludes the hearsay assertion. The
court does not assess the trier of fact's ability to discount from
probative value. If this approach were taken when an ambiguous
assertion is offered under the "catch-all" exceptions, a court
should exclude the evidence rather than rely on the trier of fact's
ability to discount. Indeed, the typical failure of courts to rec-
ognize the danger of ambiguity in the cases already decided
under the "catch-als" is some evidence that ambiguous asser-
tions do not "carry the badge of their own weakness."
I concede that courts' recognition of the danger of ambiguity
is unlikely to stem the modern trend to admit hearsay. It may
be that in the usual case, in which ambiguity in an assertion is
recognized, a judge will consider the ambiguity to affect the
weight of evidence, not its admissibility, and rely on opposing
119 1 thank my helpful colleague, Professor Norm Abrams, for this nice phrase.
110 Current questions surrounding the admissibility of testimony from witnesses who
have been hypnotized previously also illustrate the dilemma between our need to admit
pertinent information and our need to exclude types of information considered untrust-
worthy, in part because of its likely effect on triers of fact. For example, State v. Hurd,
432 A.2d 86, 95 (N.J. 1981) held such evidence admissible if appropriate safeguards
were followed during the hypnotic session, reasoning that jurors could understand the
inherent weaknesses of evidence and weigh it accordingly. People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d
775 (Cal. 1982), on the other hand, held that any testimony from a witness who had
been hypnotized previously was inadmissible as to any information covered in the
hypnotic session. The California court reasoned that cross-examination would be largely
ineffective to expose its unreliability. See id. at 804 n.51. This is another way of saying
that exclusion is required because of the risk that the trier of fact will be unable to
discount the testimony sufficiently. The issue, a recurring one in the law of evidence,
may soon be resolved for hypnosis. The United States Supreme Court has granted




counsel to urge the shortcomings of the assertion during argu-
ment. There undoubtedly will be cases, however, where an as-
sertion's ambiguity, perhaps combined with other factors, impels
a judge to exclude it. This essay may at least serve as a string
around a trial judge's finger reminding her that ambiguity is a
legitimate and definable hearsay concern.
CONCLUSION
A few centuries ago, Sir Walter Raleigh was executed in the
Tower of London after being convicted of treason. 121 The con-
viction rested in part on the hearsay testimony of a fisherman,
who testified that "a Portuguese gentleman" had told him that
Raleigh intended to murder the King. One would think that the
possibility that the fisherman's testimony would be admissible
today had been safely put to rest. Yet, if a federal judge believed
that the Portuguese gentleman's statement was made under con-
ditions suggesting its trustworthiness, Sir Walter might fare no
better today than he did under Elizabeth.
The modern trend to admit hearsay is evidenced in the
"catch-all" exceptions themselves; in the frequency with which
those exceptions are used to admit grand jury testimony, 122 and
in the many decisions, some of which were discussed above, that
admit statements not under oath that are made in circumstances
considered "trustworthy." The risk of ambiguity has been lost
in that trend. Although no claim is made that the risk is suffi-
ciently large to reverse the trend, ambiguity should at least serve
as a factor that courts take into account when considering the
trustworthiness of an assertion. The factors discussed in Section
II of this essay may enable attorneys and judges to assess am-
biguity with some degree of accuracy. We must not forget that
the hearsay rule was enacted to protect against very real dangers
and we should be reluctant to admit hearsay unless satisfied that
it has overcome these dangers. The residual exceptions provide
repeated opportunities for courts to develop factors that impact
on the trustworthiness of hearsay. Ambiguity, I suggest, should
be one of those factors.
"I Unfortunately, not before he wrote a number of poems that were the bane of
one person's junior high school education.
'1 CRIMINAL LAW BunTN Vol. 8 p. 100.
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